Continuing After Species: An Afterword by Wilson, Robert A.
In J.S. Wilkins, I. Pavlinov, F. Zachos Species and Beyond, in press 





Continuing After Species: An Afterword 
 
Robert A. Wilson 







This afterword to Species and Beyond provides some reflections on species, with special attention 
to what I think the most significant developments have been in the thinking of biologists and 




Continuing After Species: An Afterword 
 
Robert A. Wilson† 






As the current volume attests, biologists who play philosopher, as well as philosophers who play 
biologist, continue after species.  For the most part, they do so in the shadow of “the species 
problem”, poking a stick at it while making some interesting observations about species taxa in 
one or more globs of biospace.  Shamelessly refusing to leave the comfort of the armchair for 
now, I would hazard the guess that philosophers and biologists alike who have responded to the 
species problem for the past 50 years with more than a poke have done so in three opposed ways: 
mostly offering solutions to the species problem (Hausdorf 2011; Richards 2010), occasionally 
declaring that a solution is impossible (Hull 1997; Reydon 2005), and elsewhere arguing that there 
is in fact no problem to be solved (Pavlinov 2013).   
 
†  This paper is dedicated to the memory of Dick Boyd and his infectious enthusiasm for scientific 
realism, naturalism, and natural kinds over the past 50 years.  I am grateful to Dick for modelling 
how to think systematically and deeply about species, amongst other things.  Thanks to John 
Wilkins for the invitation to write these reflections, and to John and to Frank Zachos for reading 
and commenting on an earlier draft. 
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 The tendency to adopt one of these responses hasn’t shown signs of decline in recent 
years, with all three tendencies clearly manifest in the current volume.  Before saying something 
about “the species problem” beyond the “It’s solved!”, “It can’t be solved!”, and “It’s not a 
problem!” responses to it, some initial stock-taking on the concept of species itself. 
At least ideologically, as a card-carrying enthusiast for naturalistic philosophy of science, 
I remain attracted to utilising the latest technical modes of empirically-informed philosophical 
methodology, despite my confessed bodily affection for the laziness of the armchair, a 
professional hazard for all (but not only) philosophers.  I was somewhat disappointed, however, 
with Siri’s refusal to answer my simple query “Are species real?”.  Undaunted and ever-
resourceful, I went directly to my methodological next stop: a Google Scholar search for 
“species”.  While not as common as either “cells” or “organisms”—and even less so once we 
add the singulars “cell” and “organism”—nonetheless “species” delivers well over 6 million hits 
on Google Scholar.  GS hits for the terms cell(s), gene(s), and species occur in roughly a 3:2:1 
ratio, shifting roughly to 3:1:2 for searches since 2020.  (Interestingly, “gene(s)” shows roughly 
the same usage level and trajectory as “organism(s)”.)   
 One thing that can be safely concluded is that talk about species has a robust academic 
history, one that shows little signs of dissipating to become merely history.  In addition, with 
over 500 million hits on Google itself, and with roughly the same ratio of hits to “cell(s)” there 
as it has on Google Scholar, “species” prima facie earns its keep in more vernacular contexts.  
The tendency to make use of or appeal to the concept of species has been and remains strong 
across academic and non-academic contexts. 
 One reason for the robustness to the concept of species within both common sense and 
scientific thinking is a clumpiness to biological nature at the level of populations that is hard to 
ignore.  As Kim Sterelny has put it in his under-appreciated “Species as Ecological Mosaics”: 
The mechanisms of evolution have produced on Earth an astounding variety of life 
forms.  Together with adaptive design, the evolution of that diversity is the central 
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explanatory target of evolutionary biology.  Though great, however, the diversity of life 
on Earth is limited in important ways.  Diversity is bunched or clumped. … Life’s 
mechanisms have produced phenomenological species: recognizable, reidentifiable clusters of 
organisms.  This fact makes possible the production of bird and butterfly field guides, 
identification keys for invertebrates and regional floras, and the like.  (Sterelny 1999, 
p.119). 
Population-level clumpiness is typically conceptualised as cohesiveness, and species cohesion 
is a primary phenomenon to be explained (for example, by “gene flow”; see Barker and Wilson 
2010).  As Sterelny goes on to note, the reality of phenomenological species is the beginning, 
rather than the end, of reflection on the nature of species and their relationships to the 
mechanisms of evolution and the diversity of life forms (see also Minelli, this volume).   For 
some, the existence of phenomenological species serves as a foundation for not only realism 
about species taxa but also about the species category, even if this proves to be a form of pluralistic 
or promiscuous realism (Dupre 1981, 1999; see also Wilson 1996, Barker, this volume).  For 
others, attempting to make more of the concept of species beyond phenomenological species is 
to invite potential confusions of various kinds.  They accordingly opt for a deflationary 
understanding of species, whereby species are little more than phenomenological species, if that 
(Ereshefsky 1992a, 1999; see also Mishler 1999, Wilkins, this volume).   
 What of “the species problem”, a focus for much of the ongoing philosophical discussion 
of species?  The species problem is really a cluster of problems.  That cluster both stems from 
and fuels at least four kinds of ongoing discussions in the philosophical deep end of the biological 
pool.  These discussions arise from and involve:  
1. the diverse characterisations that have been given of species by biologists over the past 
100 years;  
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2. questions about the standing of species as a distinctive rank in the Linnaean hierarchy 
that has remained the dominant scheme of taxonomic classification of populations of 
organisms since it established itself as such over 250 years ago;  
3. debates over the ontological status of species, such as whether species are natural kinds, 
individuals, processes, feedback systems, or even, as John Locke might have put it, 
creatures of the understanding; 
4. emerging technologies for species delimitation (such as coalescent models) and the 
corresponding issue of species discordance.   
If we continue to locate species as one of the Big Four concepts applied in describing and 
explaining the world of living things—gene, cell, organism, and species—perhaps the confluence 
of the preceding four dimensions partially explains why there is a species problem but no 
corresponding gene, cell, or organism problems.   
The other part to such an explanation, however, is surely historical, concerning two 
distinct spotlights thrown on species in the history of biological thought.  First, species were cast 
on stage by the title of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859).  Darwin’s 
own reflections on and hesitations about species continue to attract scrutiny and discussion, even 
in recent years (de Queiroz 2011; Mallett 2010, 2013; Stamos 2003).  Second, the term “biological 
species concept” was both introduced and promoted by the ornithologist Ernst Mayr (Mayr 
1942) and others (Wright 1940; Dobzhansky 1950) as labelling a settled view of the nature of 
species.  That view, according to which species are reproductively isolated populations stabilized 
by gene flow resulting from interbreeding, emerged from the so-called Modern Synthesis of the 
1930-40s that integrated the theory of natural selection and genetics, or to put it more crudely, 
Darwin and Mendel.   
 In the introduction to my collection of essays Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (MIT 
Press, 1999), I noted that “the last decade has seen something of a publication boom on the 
topic” (Wilson 1999a, p.ix), going on to chiefly cite collections with dominant contributions from 
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biologists: “Otte and Endler 1989; Ereshefsky 1992b; Paterson 1994; Lambert and Spence 1995; 
Claridge, Dawah, and Wilson 1997; Wheeler and Meier 1999 [sic]; Howard and Berlocher 1998” 
(p.ix).  Much of that publication boom was in response to the growing recognition of the 
breakdown of whatever consensus there was around Mayr’s “biological species concept”, and 
how that did (and didn’t) affect the continuation of thinking about processes of speciation and 
the goals of conservation and the preservation of biological diversity. 
 One editorial directive given to me in the invitation to write this Afterword was to reflect 
especially on the development of discussions of species and the species problem over the past 
25 years.  The trading zone between philosophers of biology and biologists of a greater variety 
of stripes has expanded, even if the bulk of recent work on core topics, such as speciation and 
phylogenetic constraints on taxonomy, continues to operate on the territory of biologists beyond 
that zone.  Both the expanded trading zone and the tendencies to live beyond it can be seen in 
Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, particularly in two essays it contains that develop ideas which 
have been especially influential during this time, the first more so amongst biologists, the second 
more so amongst philosophers.   
Kevin de Queiroz’s “The General Lineage Concept of Species and the Defining 
Properties of the Species Category” provided one of his earliest and most extended discussions 
of the general lineage concept of species, while Richard Boyd’s “Homeostasis, Species, and 
Higher Taxa” remains the most discussed paper on the homeostatic property cluster view of 
natural kinds that has an application to species.  Each of these views might be best thought of as 
providing an overarching framework for thinking about species, one completed by further 
biological details that might well vary from context to context.   
De Queiroz’s (1998, 1999) general lineage conception of species (later, metapopulation 
lineage conception, de Queiroz 2005, 2007), has come to be viewed by many as the successor to 
Mayr’s biological species concept, being the closest thing we have to an adequate, monistic 
conception of species.  For de Queiroz, species are “segments of population-level lineages” (de 
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Queiroz 1999:53), with different extant species conceptions providing different criteria for the 
segmentation, and “populations” covering both sexual and asexually reproducing organisms.  
While its generality in subsuming more specific views of the nature of species is no doubt one 
source of its appeal for biologists, philosophers are more likely to view segments of population-level 
lineages as taking us little way to identifying what species are.  In the morass of biological entities, 
many things—from nuclear families to multi-Order clades—are such segments: a parent and its 
offspring form a segment of a population-level lineage; a pair of these form a metapopulational 
lineage segment.  Since the ancestor-descendant relationship holds of many biological entities, 
segments of population-level lineages are ubiquitous in the living world, as are metapopulations.  
The heavy lifting, conceptually speaking, lies elsewhere in delineating species as a particular type 
of metapopulational lineage. 
As influential amongst philosophers of biology as the metapopulational lineage 
conception has been amongst biologists has been Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster view of 
species and of natural kinds more generally (Boyd 1999; see also Griffiths 1999 and Wilson 
1999a).  The HPC view, originally developed in defending moral realism (Boyd 1988), has been 
articulated as part of a broader naturalistic form of scientific realism (Boyd 1991, 2010, 2019).  
For Boyd, species are phenomena that cohere due to a variety of homeostatic mechanisms, such 
as gene exchange, reproductive isolation, coadapted gene complexes, developmental constraints, 
and niche construction (e.g., Boyd 1999: 164-165), and these phenomena are mostly plausibly 
viewed as natural kinds (pp.167-169).  Here the general idea has been to reconceptualise what 
natural kinds are, showing how thinking of species as such reconceptualised kinds both allows 
one to address many issues about species and to serve as a paradigm for other applications (see 
also Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt 2007; Wilson 2005: ch.3-6). 
In commissioning and assembling the essays in Species, I took its subtitle, New 
Interdisciplinary Essays, not only to refer to the interface between biologists and philosophers but 
also to signal an invited expansion in the nature of the interdisciplinary contributions to the 
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discussion.  In addition to innovative and influential essays from evolutionary theorists (such as 
de Queiroz) and philosophers of biology (such as Boyd), the volume also included contributions 
from a pair of developmental psychologists (Keil and Richardson 1999), a cultural anthropologist 
(Atran 1999), and a ciliatologist specializing in eukaryotic protists (Nanney 1999).   
 Research since then on “folk biology” in both developmental psychology and cultural 
anthropology has blossomed, with perhaps its best-known application being in the sophistication 
of discussions of Indigenous classification and taxonomy of the living world (Ludwig and El-
Hani 2020; Ludwig and Poliseli 2018; Ludwig and Weiskopf 2019).  Yet this work has had only 
a limited impact on core discussions of species and the species problem amongst philosophers 
and biologists (see Kendig 2020 and Kendig, this volume, for exceptions).   
 By contrast, the corresponding discussions not so much of eukaryotic protists in 
particular but of the microbial world more generally have informed those discussions.  In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that Wilkins devotes to microbial species roughly one-third of a 
chapter newly added to the second edition of his Species: The Evolution of the Idea, “The 
Development of the Philosophy of Species” (esp. pp.317-330; see also Wilkins 2006).  Insights 
gained from this attention to the microbial world have informed more general views of the nature 
of species.  For example, explorations of the significance of lateral or horizontal gene transfer, 
more prevalent in the microbial than in the macrobial world, have reinforced one idea fueling 
pluralistic views of the species category: that whatever “species” are in bacteria they are really 
something different in kind from species in plants and animals (O’Malley 2014: ch.2; see also 
Franklin 2007, Franklin-Hall 2010).   
The microbial geneticist Ford Doolittle has developed perhaps the most sophisticated 
forms of this view over a number of years (e.g., Doolittle 2009, 2013, 2019; Doolittle and 
Zhazybayeva 2009; Novack and Doolittle 2020).  Other and contrasting recent discussions have 
defended the application of Mayr’s biological species concepts to bacteria by assimilating 
homologous recombination to interbreeding (Bobay and Ochman 2017, 2018), building on 
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earlier work by Dykhuizen and Green (1991) on Escherichia coli and extending this assimilative 
exercise to encompass the pangenome, the complete set of genes in all strains of a given microbial 
species (Bobay 2020).    
The associated development of metagenomics alongside techniques for large-scale 
sampling of genomic elements, both of which have been pioneered in the microbial world, forms 
part of this shift informing a species literature that has been skewed historically by an 
overwhelming focus on the macrobial world.  The growth of computationally-driven delimitation 
methods, the most popular of which are multispecies coalescent models (Carstens et al. 2013), 
has been one important development in the species literature.  Viewed as integrating population 
genetics with phylogenetic analysis in order to more accurately construct species trees, 
multispecies coalescent models now provide a large number of algorithmic species discovery 
procedures that have been taken to build on de Queiroz’s general lineage conception of species 
(see Quinn, this volume; Smith and Carstens, this volume).      
In light of these developments it is easy to forget that, until the turn of the twenty-first 
century, microbes—bacteria and the eukaryotic protists, for example—were largely ignored in 
the species literature.  Furthermore, attempts to shed that ignorance were often met with ridicule 
and hostility.  Bacteria were typically simply bracketed out from the rest of the living world in 
discussions of species; in an informal interview, Ernst Mayr went so far as to call eukaryotic 
protists a “sort of garbage can group” (Mayr 2004).  Microbial biologists, whether working on 
bacteria, eukaryotic protists, or other microbial organisms and clonelines, mostly just got on with 
the job of describing the diversity they found in the microbial world (Nanney 1999, Warren et al. 
2016).  They chiefly opted for phenetic views of microbial groups, including of those referred to 
by Linnaean binomials and so regarded as species.   
 Although both the labels “pheneticism” and “numerical taxonomy” (Sokal and Crovello 
1970; Sneath and Sokal 1973) have made a quiet exit from discussions of species over the past 
25 years, it is perhaps worth reflecting on the relationship between multispecies coalescent 
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models and pheneticism.  Both ultimately rely on computational strategies that require 
judgements of similarity, revealing a conventional dimension to taxonomic decisions, including 
with respect to species.  The reliance of pheneticism about species on similarity judgments of 
this kind served as a red flag for those skeptical of either mind-dependent or theoretically neutral 
conceptions of species (e.g., Hull 1997, 1999; Mayden 1997).  Whether the same holds true of 
multispecies coalescent models, or whether they are, by contrast, taken to manifest a kind of 
pluralistic realism about species (Nathan 2019a), remains to be seen. 
This niche in the species literature promises to become further sophisticated by the 
continuing integration of focused discussions of genealogical discordance (Haber 2019, Velasco 
2019).  Here the lineages of component entities (such as genomes) diverge from those of which 
they are components (such as organisms and species).  More general discussion of the 
phenomenon of discordance (Haber and Molter 2019) has already informed views of 
multispecies biofilms (Pedroso 2019) and broader evaluations of methodologies within 
phylogenetic reconstructions (Quinn 2019). 
Both de Queiroz’s metapopulational lineage conception of species and Boyd’s 
homeostatic property cluster view of species have suggested ways to develop kinds of pluralistic 
realism about species.  “Pluralism” because of the multiplicity of criteria for lineage segmentation 
(de Queiroz) and of homeostatic mechanisms (Boyd), and “realism” as acknowledgment that 
these criteria and mechanisms constitute the joints at which nature itself is carved.  The attraction 
of an eliminativist view of species has proved strong for some who have weighted the pluralistic 
dimension to such views more heavily (Mishler and Donoghue 1982; Ereshefsky 1992a), leading 
to the idea that, as Mishler and Wilkins (2018: 1) have noted, “the species rank should disappear 
as part of a general move to rankless taxonomy (Ereshefsky 1999, Mishler 1999; Pleijel 1999)”.   
Barker (2019b) has recently argued that a dilemma facing Ereshefsky’s (1992a) arguments 
for eliminative pluralism holds more generally for all extant forms of eliminative pluralism.  Call 
the categories putatively replacing the species concept the successor categories.  Barker’s dilemma 
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turns on the features and relationships shared by such successor categories.  If these are shared 
across successor categories, then they are the basis for forming a superordinate category—such 
as species—thus undermining the eliminativist part of eliminativist pluralism.  If these are not 
shared across successor categories, however, then this undermines the pluralism of the view, since 
without these each successor category inherits whatever doubts there are about the scientific 
interest of the species category (see Barker 2019b: 672-673).   
***** 
Given that this afterword began with some faux-data about “species”, it seems appropriate that 
it end with a perhaps apocryphal story about philosophy.  In the darkness before naturalistic light 
illuminated philosophy of biology as a new field within the philosophy of science just over 50 
years ago, the end of philosophy was being predicted by many in the Anglo-American traditions 
dominated by “linguistic philosophy”.  What had been figured out was that philosophical 
problems were puzzles to be dissolved, matters simply of the language games we chose to play 
or not play.  And all that was needed was a record of what philosophy was, a record to be created 
as the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   
 Contained within the eight large volumes of the original Encyclopedia was barely a whiff 
of anything about the philosophy of biology, let alone about species, except insofar as Aristotle 
seemed to have had views about them.  Wind forward to the contemporary online treasure-trove, 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and things couldn’t look more different.  “Species” not only 
of course has its own substantive entry, but discussions of species can be found in articles on 
conservation biology, biodiversity, Darwinism, human nature, philosophy of macroevolution, 
and biological individuals.  Rather than being records of a moribund past, these discussions are 
very much part of ongoing interchanges between philosophers and biologists, often drawing as 
much on articles in journals in the evolutionary, ecological, and other biological sciences as on 
those in Philosophy of Science or Biology and Philosophy.  If they are a record of anything, they are a 
record of the healthy future that the species problem has for philosophers and biologists alike. 
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